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therefrom, are bad; this is evident from III. xxxix. and IV. xxxvii.
Corollary II. Whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is base, and in a State unjust. This also is evident
from III. xxxix., and from the definitions of baseness and injustice in IV. xxxvii. note.
Note. Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. stated to be bad) and laughter I recognize a great
difference. For laughter, as also jocularity, is merely pleasure; therefore, so long as it be not excessive, it is in
itself good (IV. xli.). Assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself, save grim and gloomy superstition. For
why is it more lawful to satiate one's hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy? I reason, and
have convinced myself as follows: No deity, nor anyone else, save the envious, takes Pleasure in my infirmity
DEFINITIONS. 18
 ETHICS PART IV. OF HUMAN BONDAGE OR THE STRENGTH OF THE EMOTIONS
and discomfort, nor sets down to my virtue the tears, sobs, fear, and the like, which are signs of infirmity of
spirit; on the contrary, the greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected, the greater the perfection whereto
we pass; in other words, the more must we necessarily partake of the divine nature. Therefore, to make use of
what comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible (not to the point of satiety, for that would not be
enjoyment) is the part of a wise man. I say it is the part of a wise man to refresh and recreate himself with
moderate and pleasant food and drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of growing plants, with
dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres, and the like, such as every man may make use of without
injury to his neighbour. For the human body is composed of very numerous parts, of diverse nature, which
continually stand in need of fresh and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of
performing all the actions, which follow from the necessity of its own nature; and, consequently, so that the
mind may also be equally capable of understanding many things simultaneously. This way of life, then,
agrees best with our principles, and also with general practice; therefore, if there be any question of another
plan, the plan we have mentioned is the best, and in every way to be commended. There is no need for me to
set forth the matter more clearly or in more detail.
PROP. XLVI. He, who lives under the guidance of reason, endeavours, as far as possible, to render back love,
or kindness, for other men's hatred, anger, contempt, towards him.
Proof. All emotions of hatred are bad (IV. xlv. Coroll. i.); therefore he who lives under the guidance of
reason will endeavour, as far as possible, to avoid being assailed by such emotions (IV. xix.); consequently,
he will also endeavour to prevent others being so assailed (IV. xxxvii.). But hatred is increased by being
reciprocated, and can be quenched by love (III. xliii.), so that hatred may pass into love (III. xliv.); therefore
he who lives under the guidance of reason will endeavour to repay hatred with love, that is, with kindness.
Q.E.D.
Note. He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is assuredly wretched. But he, who strives to conquer
hatred with love, fights his battle in joy and confidence; he withstands many as easily as one, and has very
little need of fortune's aid. Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, but through
increase in their powers; all these consequences follow so plainly from the mere definitions of love and
understanding, that I have no need to prove them in detail.
PROP. XLVII. Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in, themselves good.
Proof. Emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain. For fear is pain (Def. of the Emotions, xiii.), and
hope (Def. of the Emotions, Explanation xii. and xiii.) cannot exist without fear; therefore (IV. xli.) these
emotions cannot be good in themselves, but only in so far as they can restrain excessive pleasure (IV. xliii.).
Q.E.D.
Note. We may add, that these emotions show defective knowledge and an absence of power in the mind; for
the same reason confidence, despair, joy, and disappointment are signs of a want of mental power. For
although confidence and joy are pleasurable emotions, they nevertheless imply a preceding pain, namely,
hope and fear. Wherefore the more we endeavour to be guided by reason, the less do we depend on hope; we
endeavour to free ourselves from fear, and, as far as we can, to dominate fortune, directing our actions by the
sure counsels of wisdom. [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]