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appendix 3 301
can be such as to ground rationally the judgement that one is not
dreaming, it really is obscure how one can ever tell which
obtains.
But all of this arises only if dreaming is to be assigned to (4), and
in fact it is absurd to assign it to (4). It belongs in either (3a) or (3b).
With these classes, as with (1) and (2), where A cannot (rationally)
tell that F(A) when F(A), because A cannot (rationally) tell any-
thing when F(A), how could it be a consequence that A could not
rationally tell that not-F(A) when not-F(A)? The point about (3)
cases is not of course that when F(A), A can detect the absence of
(rational) decision and use that as his way of telling that F(A). The
point is that in (3) cases, there is no question of there being a
(rational) way of telling anything when F(A), so it cannot be a
complaint against a suggested rational way of telling something (in
particular, that not-F(A)), that it cannot be used in circumstances in
which necessarily no way of rationally telling anything can be
used.
Of course, there are important differences between (3) cases,
such as dreaming, and (1) and (2). Thus in (3) cases, A may have
false beliefs. So not surprisingly there is a sceptical problem about
dreaming, but not about dreamless sleep. But this difference does
not merely return us to scepticism. The assignment of dreaming to
(3) is not just a classification in the abstract: it reflects features of
dreaming, features which cannot of course be appealed to when we
are dreaming, for no features can be rationally appealed to when
dreaming, but which can (contra Malcolm) be rationally appealed
to at the only time when we can rationally appeal to anything, viz.
when we are awake.
What we can deploy when we are awake are certain consider-
ations about what dreaming is like and what waking is like. Very
importantly, we do not just have an asymmetry of coherence, but
also have a perspective in which we can place dreaming in relation
to waking. From the perspective of waking we can explain dream-
ing, and this is an important asymmetry. Such features are part of
our way of telling, when we are awake, that we are awake. Of
course it is true that we cannot make rational reference to these
features, or to anything else, to decide that we are dreaming when
302 appendix 3
we are dreaming, but that is itself a consequence of things we
understand when we are awake, about dreaming.
The claim that Descartes saw dreaming in the light of (4) rather
than (3) is based on the consideration, which I take to be true, that
he thought that one could at any moment withhold assent from
one s experience and stand back from it in the critical spirit of the
Doubt. This does imply that rational decision is a power which is
not vitiated in dreaming. Yet it is a notable fact that the passage in
the Sixth Meditation is entirely from the perspective of waking,
and is, as it should be, only about how we can, when we are awake,
tell that we are awake.
INDEX
References to Descartes s works in this index are solely to passages of the
text in which their history or general character are discussed. References to
Descartes s contemporaries include passages in which they are mentioned
only as recipients of letters from him.
Absolute conception, the, 49 52, Belief, 23 37, 39 40, 44 5, 53, 185,
196 7, 224, 230 2, 285 8 292 5
Académie des Sciences, 10 and the will, 160 8, 220
Action, 56 60, 265 6, 269 71, Benevolence, see God
273 4 Bennett, J., 56
Animals, 212, 268 70, 273 Berkeley, George, 207, 225, 236
Anselm, Saint, 139, 141, 145 Berlin, I., 85
Aquinas, Saint Thomas, 139, 265f. Bérulle, Pierre de, 2
Aristotle, 11f., 237, 240 1, 288 Bossuet, Jacques Bénigne, 4
Arnauld, Antoine, 6, 92, 97 8, 109, Bourdin, Pierre, 7
111, 144, 175ff., 267 Burman, Francis, 76, 86, 246, 264,
Assent, 160 9 267, 271
Attributes and modes, 108 12,
221 2 Caterus, Joannes, 6
essential, see Properties Cause, 120 3, 126 9, 134ff., 144 5,
Augustine, Saint, 72, 91 151, 170, 218 19
Ayer, A. J., 85 First, 135
Cavell, S., 86
Bacon, Francis, 11, 245 Cavendish, William, Marquis of
Baillet, Adrien, 16, 85 Newcastle, 6, 269f.
Beck, David, 9 Certainty, 22 3, 31, 34 6, 52, 59 60,
Beck, L. J., 16 64ff., 70, 171ff., 176 87, 188ff.,
Beeckman, Isaac, 2 197, 252
304 index
Chanut, Hector-Pierre, 8, 244 Doubt, hyperbolical, 42 4, 70, 146
Christina, Queen of Sweden, 8, 9 Method of, see Method of
Church, censure by the, 3 4, 9, perceptual propositions,
257ff. 36 41, 52 3
Circle, the Cartesian, 93, 175 89 Dreaming, 37 8, 217, 297 302
Clarity and distinctness, Dunn, J., xv
distinguished, 272; see also
Ideas Egocentricity, 53
Clerselier, Claude, 3, 75, 91, 173, 243 Elizabeth, Princess, 7, 16, 20, 100,
Cogito, the, 58 85, 91, 133, 165, 267
170ff., 295 Enquirer, the Pure, see Pure
as an inference, 61, 72 3, 145 Enquiry, philosophical, 19 20
Colvius, Andreas, 72, 91 Enquiry, Pure, see Pure
Consciousness, 66 7, 95, 272 3, Error, possibility of, 36 9, 41 2, 57,
278 82 149 56, 170 81, 193 4, 216,
Cordemoy, Geraud de, 289 219, 233 4
Cottingham, J., 86, 264 Essence, 104, 108, 221
of physical objects, 202 8,
Davidson, D., 285, 290 213 14, 221
Debeaune, Florimond, 10 of the self, 93 6, 101 2
Deception, 57; see also God Essential properties, 100 3, 108
Deduction, 73, 177 8 Evident propositions, 64 8
of scientific knowledge, 247 52, Existence, 57 60, 60 85, 89 94,
254 6 133 4, 148
Democritus, 227, 237 of God, see God
Demon, the malicious, 41, 86, 149, of the external world, 137, 151,
170, 217 170, 196, 254 5, 265
Dennett, D. C., 297 of the mental, 278 85
Desargues, Girard, 10, 243 of physical objects, 199 207, 212,
Designation, 272 218 19
Determinacy of the mental, Experiment, scientific, 242, 244 5,
266 85 248 9
Determinism, physical, 261 3 Extension, 91, 196, 213 15, 256, 261
Dijksterhuis, E. J., 263
Dikshoorn, C., 263 Feldman, F., 85, 86
Dinet, Father, 7 Fermat, Pierre de, 6
Dioptric, 4, 6 First person, 52 4, 66, 76 85, 113
Discourse on the Method, 4f., 14, Forge, Louis de la, 289 [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]